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Abstract—Pilot contamination attack (PCA) in a time division
duplex wireless communication system is considered, where an
eavesdropper (Eve) attacks the reverse pilot transmission phase
in order to wiretap the data transmitted from a transmitter,
Alice, to a receiver, Bob. We propose a new PCA scheme for
Eve, wherein Eve does not emit any signal by itself but uses
an intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) to reflect the pilot sent by
Bob to Alice. The proposed new PCA scheme, referred to as
IRS-PCA, increases the signal leakage from Alice to the IRS
during the data transmission phase, which is then reflected by
the IRS to Eve in order to improve the wiretapping capability
of Eve. The proposed IRS-PCA scheme disables many existing
countermeasures on PCA due to the fact that with IRS-PCA,
Eve no longer needs to know the pilot sequence of Bob, and
therefore, poses severe threat to the security of the legitimate
wireless communication system. In view of this, the problems
of 1) IRS-PCA detection and 2) secure transmission under IRS-
PCA are considered in this paper. For IRS-PCA detection, a
generalized cumulative sum (GCUSUM) detection procedure is
proposed based on the framework of quickest detection, aiming
at detecting the occurrence of IRS-PCA as soon as possible once
it occurs. For secure transmission under IRS-PCA, a cooperative
channel estimation scheme is proposed to estimate the channel of
the IRS, based on which zero-forcing beamforming is designed
to reduce signal leakage.
Index Terms—Pilot contamination attack, physical layer secu-
rity, secure transmission, quickest detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Accurate channel state information (CSI) at transmitter side
(CSIT) is a key enabler of physical layer secure transmission in
multiple-antenna wireless communication systems [1]. In time
division duplex (TDD) systems, CSIT is usually obtained by
reverse pilot transmission (RPT) based on channel reciprocity.
However, the pilot sequence is usually publicly known, which
gives rise to the so-called pilot contamination attack (PCA).
PCA was first proposed in [2], wherein an active eavesdrop-
per (Eve) transmits the same pilot sequence as that transmitted
by a legitimate receiver, Bob, to the legitimate transmitter,
Alice, during the RPT phase. The occurrence of PCA causes
inaccurate CSIT and leads to the significantly increased signal
leakage to Eve during the subsequent data transmission (DT)
phase. The vulnerability of multiple-antenna systems to PCA
has been extensively investigated in [3]–[7]. Specifically, [3]
revealed that the secure degree of freedom of a single-cell
cellular network becomes zero if an active Eve performs PCA.
[4] showed that if multiple Eves perform PCA cooperatively,
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the wiretapping signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) can be signif-
icantly improved. [5]–[7] investigated PCA in multiple-cell
and multiple-user networks, and the simulation results in [7]
indicate that PCA degrades the network throughput by more
than 50%.
A. Related work and literature review
In view of the severe threat of PCA on multiple-antenna
systems, many methods have been proposed for PCA detection
and secure transmission (ST) under PCA [3], [5], [8]–[26].
Through a comprehensive review of existing literature, most
existing countermeasures on PCA can be classified into one of
the following four categories or be viewed as their combina-
tions: 1) random modulation (RM) based method [8]–[11], 2)
artificial noise or random data (ANRD) aided method [12]–
[18], 3) random orthogonal pilot (ROP) based method [3],
[19], [20], and 4) statistic feature (SF) based method [5], [21]–
[26]. The common idea behind the methods in the former three
categories is to introduce extra randomness into the standard
RPT phase, which aims at disabling Eve to know in advance
the sequence that Bob will send in the RPT phase. The SF-
based method relies on the fact that the SFs of the signal
sequence received by Alice (Bob) in the RPT (DT) phase are
quite different when PCA occurs and when PCA is absent.
Denote by u ∈ Cτp×1 the publicly known pilot sequence
with τp being the sequence length. We briefly introduce the
four categories of countermeasures on PCA in literature below.
1) RM-based method [8]–[11]: In RM-based method, u is
divided into several subsequences, e.g., u = [uT1 ,u
T
2 , · · · ]T ,
each of which is multiplied by a randomly generated symbol
that is only known to Bob, and the sequence that Bob actually
sends in the RPT phase is ub(s) = [s1u
T
1 , s2u
T
2 , · · · ]T , where
s = [s1, s2, · · · ]T consists of the random symbols. To enable
Alice to detect PCA, s is usually designed to present some
special structure. For instance, in [8], s1, s2, · · · were ran-
domly selected from a pre-given phase shift key constellation,
and by utilizing the fact that s is unknown to Eve, PCA
can be detected by checking the cross-correlation coefficient
between two different channel estimations obtained by using
two different pilot subsequences. In general, if PCA occurs,
the RM-based method does not enable Alice to estimate the
CSI because Alice does not know s. In [11], s was secretly
shared between Alice and Bob, and in this way, [11] proposed
a method for Alice to simultaneously estimate the CSIs of Bob
and Eve if PCA occurs.
2) ANRD-aided method [12]–[18]: In ANRD-aided
method, in addition to u, Bob also sends a random sequence
2s ∈ Cτs×1, which is only known to Bob. There are two
methods to transmit s, which we refer to as superposition
transmission [12]–[14] and separate transmission [15]–
[18], respectively. In superposition transmission, u and
s are simultaneously transmitted with τs = τp, and thus
Bob actually sends ub(s) = ǫu +
√
1− ǫ2s in the RPT
phase, where ǫ ∈ (0, 1) is the power allocation factor. In
separate transmission, s is transmitted after the transmission
of u, and thus, the sequence that Bob actually sends is
ub(s) = [u
T , sT ]T ∈ C(τp+τs)×1. Due to the lack of
knowledge about s, the signal sequence sent by Eve will be
linearly independent of ub(s) with high probability. In view
of this, [13] proposed a minimum description length criterion
based method to detect PCA. And if PCA truly occurs, [14],
[17] proposed to estimate the channels of Bob and Eve by
using independent component analysis.
3) ROP-based method [3], [19], [20]: In ROP-based
method, the pilot transmitted by Bob is randomly selected
from a set of mutually orthogonal pilots. Eve not knowing
which pilot Bob will send is not able to always transmit the
same pilot as that transmitted by Bob. Therefore, as long as
Alice receives more than one pilot, the occurrence of PCA
can be confirmed [19]. In [3], the authors proposed to encrypt
the pilot so that Alice knows the pilot sequence sent by Bob
in advance. In this way, Alice can estimate the CSIs of Bob
and Eve if PCA occurs. In [20], it was revealed that Alice and
Bob need not encrypt the pilot as in [3] if the channels of Bob
and Eve were spatial correlated. In fact, knowing the channel
covariance matrices, Alice can “guess” the pilot sent by Bob
using maximal likelihood detection.
4) SF-based method [5], [21]–[26]: The occurrence of
PCA leads to the increase in the energy received by Alice,
denoted by Ea, in the RPT phase and the decrease in the
energy received by Bob, denoted by Eb, in the DT phase,
which motivates the energy-based detector in [21]–[24]. For
instance, in [21], the occurrence of PCA was claimed if
Ea (Eb) was larger (small) than a predesigned threshold. In
[25], except for the RPT phase, an extra forward channel
training phase was used for Bob to estimate the CSI. If PCA
does not exist, the CSI estimated by Bob is expected to be
nearly the same as that estimated by Alice due to the channel
reciprocity. In [26], it was assumed that the channels of Bob
and Eve were spatially correlated with Rb and Re being the
covariance matrices, respectively. Then, PCA can be detected
by performing a (generalized) likelihood ratio test (LRT). In
[5], Rb and Re were further utilized to construct minimum
mean square error (MMSE) channel estimators and design
secure beamforming vector.
B. Motivations of this work
Though the methods to combat with PCA have been ex-
tensively investigated for several years, the vulnerability of
multiple-antenna systems to PCA is still far from being solved.
In this paper, we present a new PCA scheme for Eve which
is shown to disable many existing countermeasures on PCA. In
the proposed PCA scheme, we let Eve exploit an intelligent
reflecting surface (IRS) to perform PCA. In brief, IRS is a
passive device that does not emit any electromagnetic wave
by itself. Instead, it reflects the electromagnetic wave from
the environment and is able to control the amplitudes and the
phases of the reflecting coefficients. Due to its flexibility, IRS
has been widely considered as an approach to enhance the
reliability and security of wireless communication systems by
carefully selecting the reflecting coefficients, see e.g., [27]–
[29]. While many researchers have proposed to utilize IRS to
improve the performance of wireless communication systems,
in this paper, we reveal that IRS can also be used by Eve
to deteriorate the performance of a wireless communication
system. In fact, with the aid of an IRS, Eve can attack the
RPT phase of a TDD system effectively even without any
knowledge on the pilot sequence. Instead of transmitting some
signal sequence by itself, Eve can simply deploy an IRS to
reflect the pilot sequence transmitted by Bob to Alice. As a
result, during the RPT phase, the signal sequence from the
IRS is always the same as that from Bob. In principle, the
RM-based, the ANRD-aided, and the ROP-based methods fail
in combating with such an IRS-aided PCA (IRS-PCA) scheme
because these methods require that the signal sequence sent
by Eve is different from that sent by Bob.
Due to the significant differences between the IRS-PCA
and the conventional PCA (C-PCA), i.e., Eve emits the pilot
sequence by itself, it is necessary to pay special attention to the
IRS-PCA and investigate the corresponding countermeasures.
Basically, two issues are of great concern, i.e., 1) IRS-PCA
detection, and 2) secure transmission under IRS-PCA.
1) IRS-PCA detection: Among the four categories of meth-
ods introduced in previous subsection, the SF-based method
still facilitates the detection. However, the problem of PCA de-
tection and the corresponding detection performance have not
yet been fully illustrated in literature. Specifically, in existing
works, the problem of PCA detection was modeled as a binary
hypothesis test (BHT) problem. In each channel coherent time
block, which consists of an RPT phase and a DT phase,
either Alice or Bob makes a decision on whether PCA has
occurred based on its received signals by performing a BHT.
The detection process runs independently in different time
blocks and the false alarm and miss detection probabilities in
each single time block were used to characterize the detection
performance. However, in practice, if Eve launches PCA over
multiple time blocks, then the detection performance can be
significantly improved by combining the signals received in
different time blocks together, which means that by performing
the detection independently in different time blocks as in
existing works may not be the optimal choice.
In practice, if Eve starts to attack the legitimate system at
some moment, it is natural to require the legitimate system to
quickly discover the presence of the attack so that countermea-
sures can be timely taken. In fact, the optimal secure trans-
mission schemes when PCA is absent and when PCA occurs
are totally different. When PCA is absent, the maximal ratio
transmission (MRT) beamforming scheme maximizes the SNR
of Bob. But if PCA occurs, the MRT beamforming scheme
causes significant signal leakage to Eve due to the inaccurate
channel estimation. To safeguard the data transmission under
PCA, elaborated channel estimation and beamforming scheme
3should be used. A basic question here is that how many time
blocks are required for the legitimate system to detect the
occurrence of PCA, i.e., the detection delay, subject to some
constraint on the reliability of the detection result, so that the
legitimate system can timely change its transmission scheme.
Besides, since PCA improves Eve’s wiretapping capability, it
is also relevant to know how many information bits that Eve
can intercept by performing PCA before it being successfully
detected by the legitimate system. These quantities are signifi-
cant to characterize the efficiency of a PCA detection method,
which, however, have not been studied in literature.
Motivated by the above observations, in this paper, we
propose a new PCA detection method based on the theory
of quickest detection [32], [33]. Our detection method works
in a sequential manner, aiming at discovering the occurrence
of IRS-PCA as quickly as possible once it starts. At each time
block, the signal sequence received by Alice during the RPT
phase will be combined with all the signal sequences received
in the past time blocks together to make a decision. We analyze
the detection delay of the proposed detection method and
evaluate the extra amount of information that Eve can intercept
due to its IRS-PCA from the time when IRS-PCA starts to the
time when IRS-PCA is successfully detected.
2) Channel estimation and secure transmission under IRS-
PCA: Under PCA, being able to estimate the channels of Bob
and Eve is important for secure transmission. In principle,
the RM-based, the ANRD-aided, and the ROP-based methods
do not work under the condition that Eve performs IRS-
PCA. For the SF-based method, some prior knowledge about
the probability distribution of Bob’s and Eve’s channels is
required to estimate the instantaneous channel coefficients.
For example, in [5], [20], the channel covariance matrices of
Bob and Eve are required in order to construct linear MMSE
channel estimators. However, in practice, it is not easy to
obtain such channel statistics, especially that of Eve, because
Eve should not cooperate with the legitimate system.
Based on the above observations, in this paper, we propose
a new channel estimation scheme for Alice to estimate the
channel between Alice and the IRS under the condition that
Eve performs IRS-PCA. In the proposed channel estimation
scheme, except for Bob, multiple cooperative nodes (CNs)
also participate in the RPT process, each of which transmits
a mutually orthogonal pilot sequence. The basic idea is that
the pilot sequences transmitted by the CNs will also be
reflected by the IRS, and thus estimating the channel between
Alice and the IRS can be achieved by analyzing the common
component in the estimated channels of the multiple CNs.
The proposed scheme does not require Alice to know the
covariance matrix of the channel of the IRS, which differs
from the methods in [5], [20]. With the proposed channel
estimation scheme, zero-forcing (ZF) beamforming can be
designed to null out the signal leakage, which greatly improves
the secrecy performance of the legitimate system.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section II
introduces the system model and the proposed IRS-PCA;
Section III discusses the proposed IRS-PCA detection scheme;
Section IV presents the cooperative channel estimation and
secure transmission scheme; Numerical results are presented
in Section V; Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notations: (·)∗, (·)T , and (·)H denote conjugate, transpose,
and conjugate transpose, respectively. E(·) and P(·) denote
mathematical expectation and probability, respectively. | · | and
‖ · ‖ denote the absolute value and the norm, respectively.
CN (·, ·) and G(·, ·) denote the complex Gaussian and Gamma
distributions, respectively. vec(X) stacks the columns of X
into a vector. Diagonal matrix is denoted by diag(·). Im
denotes the m-by-m identity matrix. inf , sup, and esssup de-
note the infimum, the supremum, and the essential supremum,
respectively. f(x) = O(g(x)) means that limx→∞ f(x)g(x) ≤
c for some constant c > 0. f(x) = ox(1) means that
limx→∞ f(x) = 0.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND IRS-PCA
Consider the transmission from a multiple-antenna trans-
mitter, Alice, to a single-antenna receiver, Bob, which works
in a TDD mode. The whole communication process lasts for
multiple time blocks and each time block consists of an RPT
phase followed by a DT phase. Denote Yk ∈ CM×τp as the
signal received by Alice during the the k-th RPT phase (i.e.,
the RPT phase in the k-th time block) with M being the
number of antennas and τp being the length of the pilot. In the
following, we first introduce the proposed IRS-PCA scheme
and then present some basic assumptions in this paper.
A. IRS-PCA scheme
In IRS-PCA, Eve keeps silent during the RPT phase.
Instead, it utilizes an IRS, which consists of N reflecting
elements, to reflect the signal sequence sent by Bob to Alice.
During the k-th RPT phase, Alice receives
Yk =


√
Pbgbhb,ku
H
b,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
from Bob
+Zk, if IRS-PCA does not occur,
√
Pbgbhb,ku
H
b,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
from Bob
+
√
PbgIHI,kΦ
(p)
k hb,I,ku
H
b,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
from the IRS
+Zk, if IRS-PCA occurs,
(1)
where Pb is the transmit power of Bob, gb and g,I are the
distance-based path losses from Bob and the IRS to Alice,
respectively, hb,k ∼ CN (0, IM ) and HI,k denote the fading
channels from Bob and the IRS to Alice in the k-th time block,
respectively, hb,I,k denotes the channel from Bob to the IRS in
k-th time block, Φ
(p)
k = diag{φ(p)1,k, φ(p)2,k, · · · , φ(p)N,k} ∈ CN×N
consists of the reflecting coefficients of the IRS in the k-th
RPT phase with 0 ≤ |φ(p)i,k | ≤ 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , [Zk]i,j ∼
CN (0, σ2a) for 1 ≤ i ≤M and 1 ≤ j ≤ τp denote the thermal
noise received by Alice in the k-th RPT phase, and ub,k is the
sequence that Bob sends in the k-th RPT phase. 1 We assume
that all the channel coefficients are i.i.d. over different time
blocks. Note that Φ
(p)
k is under the control of Eve. In this
1 In (1), the signals received by Alice are different when IRS-PCA occurs
and when IRS-PCA is absent. It should be noted that this does not necessarily
mean that Eve needs to hide the IRS if the IRS-PCA is not harnessed. In fact,
in this paper, we do not impose any restriction on Eve’s behavior when it
does not perform the IRS-PCA.
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Fig. 1: System Model.
paper, we assume that Φ
(p)
k remains unchanged during the k-
th RPT phase but can be different in different time blocks.
Specifically, for k′ 6= k, Φ(p)k is not necessarily equal to Φ(p)k′ .
2 An comprehensive system model is illustrated in Fig 1.
The effects of IRS-PCA can be summarized as follows:
1) It is of little use for the legitimate system to introduce
any extra randomness to the RPT process because the
signal sequence from Bob will always be reflected by the
IRS, and Eve can effectively attack the RPT phase even
without any knowledge about ub,k.
2) Alice cannot combat with IRS-PCA by utilizing the
differences between the signal sequences from Bob and
the IRS, and the RM-based, the ANRD-aided, and the
ROP-based methods, in principle, become disabled.
Based on these observations, in this paper, we assume that
Bob directly transmits the publicly known pilot sequence u in
the RPT phase for simplicity, i.e., ub,k = u.
Based on (1), if the probability distribution of hb,k is
known, then (generalized) LRT facilitates to detect IRS-PCA,
which degrades to an energy-based detector when hb,k ∼
CN (0, IM ). Besides, based on the signal model in (1), to
discriminate Bob’s and the IRS’s channels, it is necessary that
Bob’s and the IRS’s channels follow different probability dis-
tributions. For example, under the spatially correlated channel
model, i.e., hb,k ∼ CN (0,Rb) and vec (HI,k) ∼ CN (0,RI),
Alice can construct linear MMSE channel estimators based on
Rb and RI as in [5], [20]. A comparison between different
solutions to PCA in literature is presented in Table 2.
Remark 1: It is worth noting that the IRS-PCA scheme is
related to the pilot replay attack (PRA) scheme studied in [30],
[31], wherein Eve acts as an amplify-and-forward (AF) relay
to receive and immediately retransmit the pilot sent by Bob.
The major difference between PRA and IRS-PCA is that in
PRA, not only the pilot sent by Bob but also the residual self-
interference (RSI) of Eve is retransmitted, as per [31, Eqn.
3]. Note that the RSI can be viewed as an independent signal
component from Eve (independent of Bob’s pilot u), which
is exploited in [31] to detect PRA. However, in the proposed
IRS-PCA scheme, we do not have such an RSI term in (1),
and thus the method in [31] does not apply to our scenario.
Besides, the method proposed in this paper can also be viewed
as an approach to cope with PRA.
2 It is noteworthy that instead of randomly choosing the reflecting coeffi-
cients, Eve can carefully design the value of the reflecting coefficients in both
the RPT and the DT phases in order to enhance its wiretapping capability.
B. Assumptions and problem statement
In this paper, we aim to design detection scheme for
Alice to discover the occurrence of IRS-PCA and further
establish secure transmission scheme to safeguard the data
transmissions. Before presenting any useful result, we first give
some basic assumptions and definitions.
Assumption 1: The channels from Bob and Eve to the IRS
and from the IRS to Alice, i.e., hb,I,k, he,I,k , and HI,k, can
be decomposed as hb,I,k = hb,I,kωb, he,I,k = he,I,kωe, and
HI,k = hI,kω
H
a , respectively. Here, ωb,ωe,ωa ∈ CN×1 are
deterministic and Eve has perfect knowledge aboutωb,ωe,ωa.
Besides, we assume that E
(|he,I,k|2) = σ2e,I, E (|hb,I,k|2) =
σ2b,I, and hI,k ∼ CN (0, IM ). 
The channel model in this assumption is in fact the Kro-
necker channel model in [34]–[37]. This assumption holds true
if there are few scatterers around the IRS, and in this case ωb,
ωe, and ωa can be viewed as the steering vectors of the array
comprised of the multiple reflecting elements. It should be
noted that this assumption enhances the attacking capability
of Eve because with the knowledge about ωb, ωe, and ωa,
Eve can design passive beamforming for the IRS, which not
only makes Alice’s channel estimation more inaccurate but
also enhances the wiretapping SNR in the DT phase.
Consider the communication between Alice and Bob over
multiple channel coherence time blocks. For convenience, we
denote Tk, k ≥ 1, as the k-th time block which consists of an
RPT phase with length τp and a DT phase with length τd. We
assume that Alice knows the value of ab ,
√
Pbgb, and for
k ≥ 1, Alice can obtain the least square estimation of hb,k,
denoted by yk =
1
abτp
Yku. Assume that starting from some
time block unknown to Alice, denoted by Tν (ν ≥ 1), Eve
performs IRS-PCA, aiming at intercepting the data transmitted
by Alice in the DT phase, then yk can be written as
yk =
1
abτp
Yku =
{
hb,k + zk, k < ν, ,(2a)
hb,k + aˆI,khI,k + zk, k ≥ ν, ,(2b)
where aˆI,k ,
aI,k
ab
with aI,k ,
√
PbgIω
H
a Φ
(p)
k ωbhb,I,k and
zk =
Zku
abτp
∼ CN (0, σ2a
a2
b
τp
IM ). Note that in (2), if ν = 1, it
means that Eve starts to perform IRS-PCA at same time when
Alice starts to communicate with Bob. Moreover, if ν = ∞,
it means that Eve never performs IRS-PCA. For notational
simplicity, in the following part of this paper, we use Pk{·} =
P{·|ν = k} and Ek{·} = E{·|ν = k} to denote the probability
and the mathematica expectation under the condition that ν =
k for ∀k ≥ 1.
In practice, if IRS-PCA does not exist, then the optimal
beamforming scheme is the MRT scheme, which maximizes
the SNR of Bob, and the beamforming vector is given by
wmrt =
yk
‖yk‖ . However, if IRS-PCA occurs, using the MRT
beamforming scheme leads to significant signal leakage to the
IRS because in this case, yk is no longer an accurate estimation
of Bob’s channel. The IRS can further reflect the signal from
Alice to Eve, which greatly enhances the wiretapping SNR
of Eve. Therefore, using the MRT scheme under IRS-PCA
will not be the best choice for securing the data transmission.
In view of the fact that Alice does not know when Eve
starts to perform IRS-PCA, i.e., the value of ν, we propose
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Category Literature Key Assumption
C-PCA
detection
ST under
C-PCA
IRS-PCA
detection
ST under
IRS-PCA
RM-based
method
[8]–[10]
√
[11]
s is secretly shared
between Alice and Bob
√ √
ANRD-aided
method
[12]–[14]
√ √
[15], [17] s is (at least partially) decodable
√ √ √
[16]
s has a special structure
that is unknown to Eve
√ √ √
[18]
Rb is known to Alice,
Eve emits strong power
–
√ √ √
ROP-based
method
[19] Require more than one pilot
√
[3] u is secretly shared –
√
[20]
Require more than one pilot,
Rb and Re are known to Alice
√ √ √ √
SF-based
method
[21]–[23]
√ √
[24]
Ea (Eb) is forwarded
(feedback) to Bob (Alice)
√ √
[25] Two-way training
√ √
[26] hX ∼ CN (0,RX), for X ∈ {b, e} √ √
[5] Rb and Re are known to Alice –
√ √ √
1
“–” means that the problem of C-PCA detection was not considered in the corresponding references. These works designed
secure transmission schemes assuming that C-PCA always exists.
2
Rb should be replaced with RI below “Key Assumption” when IRS-PCA is considered.
a sequential detection scheme for Alice to quickly determine
whether IRS-PCA has occurred based on the framework of
quickest detection [32]. Theoretically, the proposed detection
procedure can be written as a stopping time, denoted by T , at
which Alice declares the occurrence of IRS-PCA,
T = inf{k : k ≥ 1,Wk(y1,y2, · · · ,yk) > η}, (3)
whereWk is the detection statistic in Tk, which is a function of
all past observations, and η is the detection threshold. Based
on T defined above, we make the following assumption on
Alice’s transmit beamforming scheme.
Assumption 2: Before the T -th time block, Alice views yk
as an estimation of hb,k and uses wmrt = yk/‖yk‖ as the
beamforming vector to transmit its data to Bob.
Note that Assumption 2 is natural becausewmrt is optimal if
no IRS-PCA exists and Alice does not have enough evidence
to declare the occurrence of IRS-PCA before the T -th time
block. Under Assumption 1 and 2, in the DT phase of Tk,
ν ≤ k < T , Bob and Eve receives
yb,k =
(√
Pagbh
H
b,kwmrt +
√
PagIq
H
b wmrt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Gb,k
xHa + z
H
b,k
(4)
ye,k =
(√
Pageh
H
e,kwmrt +
√
PagIq
H
e,I,kwmrt
)
xHa + ze,k
=
(
aeh
H
e,k + a˜I,kh
H
I,k
)
wmrt︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Ge,k
xHa + z
H
e,k, (5)
where qHb,k = h
H
b,I,kΦ
(d)
k H
H
I,k, q
H
e,I,k = h
H
e,I,kΦ
(d)
k H
H
I,k
ae ,
√
Page with Pa being the transmit power of Alice
and ge being the path loss between Alice and Eve, a˜I,k ,√
PagIhe,I,kω
H
e Φ
(d)
k ωa, xa ∈ Cτd×1 denotes the data se-
quence that Alice transmits to Bob satisfying 1τdE
{‖xa‖2} =
1, zb,k ∼ C(0, σ2bIτd) and ze,k ∼ C(0, σ2eIτd) denote
the noise received by Bob and Eve, respectively, he,k ∼
CN (0, IM ) is the channel from Eve to Alice, and Φ(d)k =
diag
{
φ
(d)
1,k, φ
(d)
2,k, · · · , φ(d)N,k
}
∈ CN×N consists of the reflect-
ing coefficients of the IRS in the k-th DT phase. Note that the
same as Φ
(p)
k , Φ
(d)
k is under the control of Eve. We assume
that Φ
(d)
k remains unchanged in the k-th DT phase, but for
k′ 6= k, Φ(d)k can be different from Φ(d)k′ . For simplicity, we
assume that Bob and Eve know the value of Gb,k and Ge,k,
respectively. This is because both Gb,k and Ge,k are scalars,
and thus can be easily learned by a dedicated training process
or directly estimated from the received data sequence. Based
on (5), the amount of information that Eve can intercept in
the k-th DT phase, ν ≤ k < T , is
Ik , τd × CIRS-PCAe,k = τd × ln
(
1 +
|Ge,k|2
σ2e
)
, (6)
where Ce,k is the channel capacity of Eve based on the
signal model in (5). Based on (6), we define the wiretapping
throughput gain (WTG) below, which characterizes the extra
amount of information that Eve can eavesdrop due to its IRS-
PCA.
Definition 1: Define WTGn ,
∑n
k=ν
(
Ik − I˜k
)
=∑n
k=ν ∆Ik, where I˜k , τd × Cno IRSe,k = τd ×
ln
(
1 + |ae|
2
σ2e
|hHe,k(hb,k+zk)|2
‖hb,k+zk‖2
)
is the amount of information
that Eve can intercept during Tk for k ≥ ν under the condition
that no IRS exists and Eve does not launch any active attack
to the legitimate system.
In general, a single run of the detection process in (3)
possibly generates two results. A false alarm event occurs if
T < ν. Recall that it is possible that Eve does not perform
IRS-PCA, i.e., ν = ∞, and in this case, any alarm raised by
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Fig. 3: Detection Model.
Alice’s detector is false. Successful detection occurs if T ≥ ν,
and in this case, T − ν is referred to as the detection delay.
We illustrate an example of the detection process in Fig. 3.
In this paper, we are interested in the following three
quantities which can be used to characterize the performance
of the detection procedure in the form of (3).
1) Average run length to false alarm (ARL2FA): Under the
condition that Eve never performs IRS-PCA, the mean
value of T is referred to as ARL2FA, i.e., ARL2FA =
E∞(T ).
2) Worst-case average detection delay (WADD): Denoted by
D(T ), WADD is defined as
D(T ) , sup
ν≥1
Dν(T ) (7)
where Dν(T ) , esssupyν−11 Eν((T − ν)
+|yν−11 ) and
yν−11 = (y1,y2, · · · ,yν−1).
3) Worst-case average wiretapping throughput gain
(WAWTG): compared with the case where there is no
IRS in the system, WTGn, defined in Definition 1, can
be viewed as the extra amount of data that Eve can
intercept by performing IRS-PCA from the ν-th to the
n-th time block. Accordingly, we define the WAWTG,
W(T ), as
W(T ) , sup
ν≥1
esssup
y
ν−1
1
Eν(WTGT−1|yν−11 )
= sup
ν≥1
esssup
y
ν−1
1
Eν
(
T−1∑
k=ν
∆Ik
∣∣∣∣yν−11
)
. (8)
where
∑ν−1
k=ν(·) is understood as zero.
In practice, if IRS-PCA does not occur, then it is expected
that Alice’s detector raises few false alarms as time goes by,
which requires the ARL2FA to be large. If Eve indeed starts to
perform IRS-PCA for some ν unknown to Alice, it is expected
that Alice can quickly discover the occurrence of IRS-PCA so
that Alice can timely take countermeasures, i.e., WADD is
desired to be small. In fact, the ARL2FA and the WADD are
two important metrics to evaluate the performance a quickest
detection scheme, see e.g. [33, Section 6], and a widely used
method to design quickest detection scheme is to minimize
the WADD subject to a lower bound on the ARL2FA, for
example, the cumulative sum (CUSUM) detection procedure
[39]. In this paper, in addition to the ARL2FA and the WADD,
we are also interested in evaluating the value ofW(T ). In fact,
W(T ) can be viewed as a weighted version of the WADD, and
the weight coefficients are ∆Ik for k ≥ ν. Note that W(T )
can be viewed not only as a performance indicator of Alice’s
IRS-PCA detection scheme but also as a measure on the threat
posed by Eve’s attack. On one hand, for a given attacking
strategy of Eve, if Alice’s detector can discover the existence
of Eve’s attack more quickly, then the number of terms in the
summation formula in Definition 1 becomes fewer, and thus
W(T ) will be smaller. On the other hand, for a given IRS-
PCA detection scheme of Alice, W(T ) can be viewed as the
secrecy performance loss of legitimate communication system
due to Eve’s attack, and a smaller value of W(T ) means that
Eve’s attack causes less harm to the legitimate communication
system.
Based on (2), the detection performance is highly related to
the sequence {aˆI,k : k ≥ ν}. Though {aˆI,k : k ≥ ν} is under
the control of Eve, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3: Suppose
1
nσ20
k+n−1∑
j=k
|aˆI,ν+j |2 = 1
n
k+n−1∑
j=k
µν+j
n→∞−−−−→ µ, (9)
uniformly in k ≥ 0 for some µ ∈ (0,∞), where σ20 , 1+ σ
2
a
a2
b
τp
and µν+j ,
|aˆI,ν+j|2
σ20
.
Note that the IRS-PCA detection scheme proposed in this
paper does not require Alice to know the value of µ and {aˆI,k :
k ≥ ν}. But this assumption is essential for analyzing the
WADD and the WAWTG. Besides, this assumption naturally
holds if the reflecting coefficients of the IRS remain the same
over different time blocks, i.e., Φ(p) = Φ
(p)
ν = Φ
(p)
ν+1 = · · · ,
and in this case, µ =
PbgI|ωHa Φ(p)ωb|2
a2
b
σ20
σ2b,I.
Based on the above assumptions, in next section, we present
an IRS-PCA detection scheme for Alice to determine whether
IRS-PCA has occurred. Given that Eve performs IRS-PCA,
a channel estimation and secure transmission scheme is pre-
sented in Section IV to safeguard the data transmissions from
Alice to Bob.
Remark 2: In formula (2), it is implicitly assumed that once
Eve starts attacking in Tν , it continues to attack in the all
subsequent time blocks, {Tν+l : l ≥ 1}. It is straight to
extend the model in (2) to more general case where whether
IRS-PCA occurs or not follows some prior probabilities that
are selected by Eve. For example, Eve can choose to perform
IRS-PCA in Tν+l for l ≥ 1 with probability 0 < ql < 1. And
if for some l ≥ 1, Eve chooses not to attack in Tν+l, then
aˆI,ν+l should be viewed as zero in (2) and (9). Even so, the
IRS-PCA detection scheme proposed in this paper still works
if (9) holds for some µ > 0.
Remark 3: In practice, it is possible that Eve utilizes an IRS
7or an AF relay to only attack the DT phase. Specifically, the
IRS (the AF relay) is only used to reflect (retransmit) the signal
sent by Alice in the DT phase to enhance Eve’s wiretapping
SNR without attacking the RPT phase. In this situation, the
channel estimation process of the legitimate system is not
affected by Eve’s attack, and therefore, the detection scheme
presented in this paper does not facilitate the legitimate system
to discover such kind of attack. Note that, in this paper, we
focus on the situation where Eve uses the proposed IRS-PCA
scheme to contaminate the channel coefficients estimated by
Alice. Detecting the attack mentioned above, which occurs
in the DT phase only, is beyond the scope of this paper and
constitutes an interesting future research.
III. DISCOVERING IRS-PCA: A QUICKEST DETECTION
FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present our IRS-PCA detection method
and analyze its performance. According to (2), if IRS-PCA
never occurs, then {yk : k ≥ 1} is a sequence of i.i.d. random
variables with common distribution CN (0, σ20IM ) and σ20 =
1+
σ2a
a2
b
τp
. If there exists a finite ν such that Eve starts to perform
IRS-PCA, then for k ≥ ν, the distribution of yk becomes
CN (0, (σ20 + |aˆI,k|2)IM ). In other words, if IRS-PCA occurs
for some finite ν, the sequence {yk : k ≥ 1} undergoes a
change in its statistic distribution. In practice, it is essential for
the legitimate system to discover the existence of the attack
as soon as possible. In view of this, the detection of IRS-PCA
naturally falls into the field of quickest detection [32].
A widely used quickest detection scheme is the CUSUM
procedure defined as follow,
TCU = inf

k : k ≥ 1, max1≤t≤k
k∑
j=t+1
Λ(yj) > ηCU

 , (10)
where Λ(yk), k ≥ 1, is the log-likelihood ratio and ηCU is
the detection threshold. In fact, if the post change samples,
i.e., {yk : k ≥ ν}, are i.i.d. distributed and if ηCU is selected
such that E∞(TCU) = γ > 1, then the CUSUM procedure
is optimal in minimizing the WADD with the ARL2FA no
smaller than γ. Namely, the CUSUM procedure is optimal in
the following sense [39], [40],
inf
T
D(T ), s.t. E∞(T ) ≥ γ, (11)
where D(T ) is defined in (7).
In our case, f1,k(yk) =
exp{−‖yk‖2/(σ20+|aˆI,k|2)}
piM(σ20+|aˆI,k|2)M , f0(yk) =
exp{−‖yk‖2/σ20}
piMσ2M0
, and thus the CUSUM procedure becomes
TCU = inf
{
k : k ≥ 1,
max
1≤t≤k
k∑
j=t+1
(
Ak‖yk‖2 −BkM
)
> ηCU
}
. (12)
where Ak ,
|aˆI,k|2
σ20(σ20+|aˆI,k|2)
and Bk , ln
(
1 +
|aˆI,k|2
σ20
)
.
However, the CUSUM procedure cannot be directly applied
in our case because Ak and Bk contain unknown parameters
{aˆe,k : k ≥ ν}. In the following, we propose a generalized
CUSUM (GCUSUM) procedure to make it capable of detect-
ing IRS-PCA.
The proposed GCUSUM procedure can be written as the
following stopping time,
TG = inf
{
n : n ≥ 1, max
1≤k≤n
Λ˜k,n > ηG
}
, (13)
Λ˜k,n = sup
x≥ξ
{
xSk,n
σ20 + x
−M(n− k + 1) ln
(
1 +
x
σ20
)}
=


M(n− k + 1) (S¯k,n − ln S¯k,n − 1) ,
if S¯k,n − 1 ≥ ξ¯,
ξ¯M(n− k + 1)S¯k,n
1 + ξ¯
−M(n− k + 1) ln (1 + ξ¯) , if S¯k,n − 1 < ξ¯,
where ηG is the detection threshold, ξ > 0 is a param-
eter to be designed, ξ¯ , ξ
σ20
, Sk,n ,
∑n
j=k ‖yj‖2
σ20
, and
S¯k,n ,
∑n
j=k ‖yj‖2
M(n−k+1)σ20 . The detection performance of (13) is
characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: By selecting ξ¯ = 1√
M ln(γ)
and ηG = (1 +
ǫ) ln(γ) for any ǫ > 0, we have E∞(TG) ≥ γ as γ → ∞. If,
in addition, Assumption 3 holds, D(TG) = O
(
ln γ
M(µ−ln(1+µ))
)
as γ →∞.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
Theorem 1 has characterized the performance of TG in
terms of the ARL2FA and the WADD. Based on Theorem
1, we now analyze W(TG). According to (5), under the
condition that Eve performs IRS-PCA and Alice uses MRT
beamforming, the channel capacity of Eve in Tk is
CIRS-PCAe,k = ln
(
1 + SNRmrt,IRS-PCAe,k
)
(14)
where SNRmrt,IRS-PCAe,k ,
1
σ2e
∣∣∣(aehHe,k + a˜I,khHI,k)wmrt∣∣∣2. The
following theorem gives a upper bounded on the mean value
of CIRS-PCAe,k .
Theorem 2: Given a˜I,k and aˆI,k, an upper bound on
E{CIRS-PCAe,k } is
E{CIRS-PCAe,k }
≤ ln
(
1 +
a2e
σ2e
+
|a˜I,k|2
σ2e
µk
1 + µk
M (1 + oM (1))
)
, (15)
where a detailed expression for oM (1) is given in (17).
Proof: Suppose x ∼ CN (0, IM ), y ∼ CN (0, IM ), z ∼
CN (0, IM ) and x,y, z are mutually independent. We have
E
{
SNRmrt,IRS-PCAe,k
}
= E
{∣∣(a˜I,kx+ aey)H(aˆI,kx+ σ0z)∣∣2
σ2e‖aˆI,kx+ σ0z‖2
}
=
a2e
σ2e
+
|a˜I,k|2
σ2e
Π, (16)
where Π , E
{ |xH(aˆI,kx+σ0z)|2
‖aˆI,kx+σ0z‖2
}
. An upper bound on Π is
8derived as follows,
Π = E


∣∣∣xH ((aˆI,k + σ0 χ‖x‖)x+ σ0z′)∣∣∣2∥∥∥(aˆI,k + σ0 χ‖x‖)x+ σ0z′∥∥∥2


= E


∣∣∣aˆI,k + σ0 χ‖x‖ ∣∣∣2 ‖x‖4∣∣∣aˆI,k + σ0 χ‖x‖ ∣∣∣2 ‖x‖2 + σ20‖z′‖2


≤ E
{
|aˆI,k|2 ‖x‖4 + σ20‖x‖2
|aˆI,k|2 ‖x‖2 + σ20 + σ20‖z′‖2
}
≤ E
{
|aˆI,k|2 ‖x‖4 + σ20‖x‖2
|aˆI,k|2 ‖x‖2 + σ20(M − 1)
}
= ME
{
|aˆI,k|2 G(M + 1, 1) + σ20
|aˆI,k|2 G(M + 1, 1) + σ20(M − 1)
}
≤M |aˆI,k|
2
(M + 1) + σ20
|aˆI,k|2 (M + 1) + σ20(M − 1)
=
|aˆI,k|2
|aˆI,k|2 + σ20
M
(
1 +
(
1
ψ3,k
− ψ3,k + ψ4,k
)
1
M
1 + (ψ3,k − ψ4,k) 1M
)
=
|aˆI,k|2
|aˆI,k|2 + σ20
M
(
1 + oM (1)
)
, (17)
where χ = x
Hz
‖x‖ ∼ CN (0, 1), z′ =
(
IM − xxH‖x‖2
)
z, ψ3,k =
|aˆI,k|2
|aˆI,k|2+σ20
, ψ4,k =
σ20
|aˆI,k|2+σ20
, and the derivation follows the
fact that x+bx+a is concave in x ∈ (0,∞) if a > b ≥ 0,
E
{
1
G(M,1)
}
= 1M−1 , and ‖z′‖2 ∼ G(M−1, 1) is independent
of χ.
Corollary 1: Given a˜I,k and aˆI,k, an upper bound on
E {∆Ik} is
E {∆Ik} ≤ τd
(
ln
(
1 +
a2e
σ2e
+
|a˜I,k|2
σ2e
µkM
µk + 1
(1 + oM (1))
)
− e
σ2e
a2e E
(
σ2e
a2e
))
. (18)
Furthermore, for massive MIMO systems, i.e.,M is sufficiently
large, we have E {∆Ik} ≤ O (lnM). For the case where Eve
works in a low SNR region, E {∆Ik} ≤ O
( |a˜I,k|2
σ2e
µk
µk+1
M
)
.
Proof: Due to the fact
|hHe,k(hb,k+zk)|2
‖hb,k+zk‖2 ∼ E(1), we obtain
that
E(Cno IRSe,k ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−x ln
(
1 +
a2e
σ2e
x
)
dx
= e
σ2e
a2e E
(
σ2e
a2e
)
∼ a
2
e
σ2e
, (19)
where E(x) ,
∫∞
1
e−tx
t dt, and “∼” holds when a
2
e
σ2e
→ 0.
Combining (19) with Theorem 2 leads to this corollary.
Corollary 2: Suppose Φ(d) = Φ
(d)
ν+k and Φ
(p) = Φ
(p)
ν+k for
∀k ≥ 0. For massive MIMO system, i.e., M is sufficiently
large, W(TG) is upper bounded by O
(
lnM
M
τd ln γ
µ−ln(1+µ)
)
as
γ →∞.
Corollary 3: Suppose Φ(d) = Φ
(d)
ν+k and Φ
(p) = Φ
(p)
ν+k for
∀k ≥ 0. If Eve works in a low SNR region, W(TG) is upper
bounded by O
(
N2 µµ+1
τd ln γ
µ−ln(1+µ)
)
as γ →∞.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
Corollary 2 reveals that W(TG) decreases with M when
M is large. This is because the detection delay decreases with
M , and if M is sufficiently large, Alice is able to immediate
discover the occurrence of IRS-PCA. Corollary 3 reveals that
under the condition that the SNR of Eve is low, W(TG) is
nearly independent of the number of antennas of Alice M .
This is because in this case, E {∆Ik} is linearly to M , and
the detection delay is inversely proportional to M as shown
in Theorem 1, the effects of which cancel out. However,
Corollary 3 also reveals that in this case W(TG) ∝ N2, and
thus Eve can significantly increase its wiretapping capability
by increasing the number of reflecting elements of its IRS.
In this section, we have proposed a sequential detection
scheme, namely the GCUSUM scheme, for Alice to detect
IRS-PCA. In next section, under the condition that Alice has
confirmed the existence of IRS-PCA, we introduce a channel
estimation method for Alice to estimate the channel of the
IRS, which can be used to reduce wiretapping SNR during
the DT phase.
IV. A COOPERATIVE CHANNEL ESTIMATION AND
BEAMFORMING SCHEME
In this section, we present our channel estimation scheme
for Alice to estimate the channel of the IRS under the
condition that Eve performs IRS-PCA. We introduce several
CNs to assist the channel estimation process of Alice. During
the RPT phase, we let each of the CNs broadcast a signal
sequence that is orthogonal to the pilot sequence sent by
Bob. Then, except for the pilot sequence sent by Bob, the
signal sequences sent by the CNs will also be reflected by the
IRS. By matching Alice’s received signal matrix with each of
the signal sequences sent by the CNs, Alice obtains multiple
sample observations on the channel of the IRS, based on which
maximal likelihood channel estimator can be constructed to
estimate the channel of the IRS.
Denote J as the number of the CNs in the system. During
the RPT phase, the j-th CN transmits vj ∈ Cτp×1 to Alice. For
1 ≤ j ≤ J , we assume that ‖vj‖2 = τp and vHj u = 0. Be-
sides, we assume that v1,v2, · · · ,vJ are mutually orthogonal,
namely, vHj vi = 0 for ∀i 6= j. In the following, for notational
simplicity, we neglect the subscript k in (1). During the RPT
phase, the signal matrix received by Alice is
Y =(abhb + aIhI)u
H
+
J∑
j=1
(√
Pjgjfj +
√
PjgIHIΦ
(p)hj,I
)
vHj +Z,
(20)
where Pj is the transmit power of the j-th CN, and gj and
fj ∼ CN (0, IM ) are the path-loss and fading channel vector
of the j-th CN, respectively, and hj,I is the channel vector
9between the j-th CN and the IRS. By matching Y with vj ,
Alice obtains
tj ,
Y vj
τp
√
Pjgj
= fj + ajhI + z˜j
= fj + bjh¯I + z˜j , 1 ≤ j ≤ J, (21)
where aj ,
√
PjgIω
H
a Φ
(p)hj,I
τp
√
Pjgj
, z˜j ,
Zvj
τp
√
Pjgj
∼
CN
(
0,
σ2a
τpPjgj
IM
)
, h¯I ,
hI
||hI|| , and bj , ||hI||aj .
We now derive a maximal likelihood estimation of h¯I.
Based on (21), given h¯I and {bj : 1 ≤ j ≤ J}, the log-
likelihood function of (t1, t2, · · · , tJ ) is
ln f
(
t1, t2, · · · , tJ |b1, b2, · · · , bJ , h¯I
)
= −
J∑
j=1
∥∥tj − bjh¯I∥∥2
σ2j
+ C, (22)
where σ2j , 1 +
σ2a
τpPjgj
for 1 ≤ j ≤ J , and C is a constant
that does not depend on {bj : 1 ≤ j ≤ J} and h¯I. Then, the
maximal likelihood estimation of h¯I, denoted by
ˆ¯hI, is
ˆ¯hI = argmin
x;‖x‖=1

 minb1,b2,··· ,bj
J∑
j=1
‖tj − bjx‖2
σ2j


= argmin
x;‖x‖=1
J∑
j=1
‖tj‖2 −
∣∣xHtj ∣∣2
σ2j
= argmax
x;‖x‖=1
J∑
j=1
∣∣xHtj∣∣2
σ2j
= argmax
x;‖x‖=1
xH

 J∑
j=1
1
σ2j
tjt
H
j

x = λmax (TTH) , (23)
where T ,
[
1
σ1
t1,
1
σ2
t2, · · · , 1σJ tJ
]
, and λmax(X) denotes
the normalized eigenvector that corresponds to the largest
eigenvalue of X . Define aCN ,
[
a1
σ1
, a2σ2 , · · · , aJσJ
]T
. The
following theorem characterizes the accuracy of ˆ¯hI in term
of estimating h¯I.
Theorem 3: As M → ∞, ˆ¯hI → hI+e‖hI+e‖ , where e ∼
CN
(
0, 1‖aCN‖2 IM
)
is independent of hI.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
By (20) and (21), ‖aCN‖2 can essentially be understood
as the weighted sum power of the signals reflected by the
IRS. Theorem 3 reveals that the estimation error is inversely
proportional to ‖aCN‖2. In principle, if we increase the
number of the CNs, then ‖aCN‖2 will also be increased,
meaning that a more accurate estimation of h¯I can be obtained.
Based on (23), ZF beamforming can be used to facilitate
secure transmission in the DT phase. The ZF beamforming
vector is
wzf ,
(
IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI
)
y
/∥∥∥(IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI )y∥∥∥ , (24)
where y is given by (2b). Therefore, the wiretapping SNR can
be written as
SNRzf,IRS-PCAe =
1
σ2e
∣∣(aehHe + a˜IhHI )wzf ∣∣2 . (25)
The following theorem characterizes SNRzf,IRS-PCAe in the
massive MIMO region.
Theorem 4: As M →∞, the wiretapping SNR satisfies
E{SNRzf,IRS-PCAe }
→|a˜I|
2
σ2e
(|aˆI|2/σ20)M
(1 + ‖aCN‖2) ((1 + ‖aCN‖2) + (|aˆI|2/σ20))
+
a2e
σ2e
(26)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D.
By comparing (26) with (17), we can see that if ‖aCN‖2
is sufficiently large, then the wiretapping SNR can be signifi-
cantly reduced with the aided of the propose ZF beamforming
scheme. This is the direct result of the fact that in this case,
the channel of the IRS can be accurately estimated, as shown
in Theorem 3
Remark 4: It should be noted that the CNs play an important
role in the proposed cooperative channel estimation scheme.
Specifically, each CN produces an independent sample obser-
vations on h¯I to facilitate Alice to estimate h¯I, as shown in
(21). In practice, the CNs can be some secure anchor nodes
that are under the control of the legitimate system or other
legitimate user devices in the considered system. For example,
in cellular networks, the CNs can be other mobile users that are
not scheduled in the considered time blocks. Another example
is that in wireless sensor networks, if a sensor node intends
to communication with the fusion center, then other sensor
nodes can act as cooperative nodes. Note that it is possible that
there is no CN in the system, and in this case, Alice can only
estimate the channels of Bob and the IRS by using the signal
model in (2b). Existing methods in [5], [20] facilitate Alice to
do so under the condition that the covariance matrices of hb
and hI are different and perfectly known to Alice. Different
from the methods in [5], [20], the proposed method exploits
the CNs in the considered system to estimate h¯I, and does not
require any knowledge about the distribution of h¯I.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present some simulation results to gain
some insights about the problem of IRS-PCA investigated in
previous sections.
We illustrate our simulation settings in Fig. 4. Suppose
that Alice, Bob, Eve, and the IRS are in the same plane
and their locations are (−d1, 0), (0,−d2), (d3, 0), and (0, d2),
respectively. For the proposed cooperative channel estimation
scheme, we randomly generate J CNs in a circular area with
the center and the radius being (0,−d2) and Rc, respectively.
The distances from Alice to Bob, Eve, the IRS, and the j-
th CN are denoted by db,a, de,a, dI,a, and dj,a, respectively.
The distances from the IRS to Bob, Eve, and the j-th CN
are denoted by db,I, de,I, and dj,I, respectively. The path
losses are set to be gb = d
−4
b,a, ge = d
−4
e,a, gI = d
−4
I,a , and
gj = d
−4
j,a . The channels from Bob, Eve, and the j-th CN to
the IRS are assumed to AWGN channels with hb,I,k = d
−2
b,Iωb,
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he,I,k = d
−2
e,Iωe, and hj,I = hj,Iωj with hj,I = d
−2
j,I . The
IRS of Eve consists of N = N1 × N2 reflecting elements
which form a N1-by-N2 planar array. Accordingly, we set
ωa, ωb, ωe, and ωj to be the steering vectors of such a planar
array with the angle of arrivals depending on the locations
of these nodes as introduced. For the passive beamforming
at the IRS, we set Φ
(p)
k = rp × diag{ωa} × diag{ω∗b} and
Φ
(d)
k = rd × diag{ωe} × diag{ω∗a} so that the beams of the
IRS during the RPT and DT phases align with the Bob-IRS-
Alice and the Alice-IRS-Eve channels, respectively. Unless
specified, we set ν = 1, rp = rd = 1, d1 = 150 m, d2 = 20 m,
d3 = 30 m, Rc = 30 m, N˜ = N1 = N2 = 7, J = 15, Pb = 20
dBm, Pj = 20 dBm for 1 ≤ j ≤ J , σ2a = σ2e = σ2b = −80
dBm with Pa normalizing
Pagb
σ2
b
to 0 dB.
A. IRS-PCA detection
In this subsection, we present numerical results to show
the detection performance of the proposed IRS-PCA detection
scheme. An energy-based detection (ED) scheme is considered
for comparison. In the ED scheme, in the k-th time block,
Alice compares ‖yk‖2 with a pre-designed detection threshold
ηE . If ‖yk‖2 > ηE , then the detector raises an alarm. The
detection procedure of the ED scheme can be characterized by
a stopping time defined as TE = inf{k : k ≥ 1, ‖yk‖2 > ηE}.
In the simulation, we set the ARL2FA of the ED scheme to
be γ, i.e., E∞(TE) = γ. Due to the fact that if no IRS-PCA
exists,
‖yk‖2
σ20
∼ G(M, 1), the detection threshold of the ED
scheme is given by ηE = σ
2
0Γ
−1
M (1/γ), where Γ
−1
M (·) is the
inverse of the incomplete Gamma function. For the proposed
GCUSUM scheme, we set ξ¯ = 1√
M ln(γ)
and ηG = ln(γ).
Extensive numerical experiments reveal that the ARL2FA of
the GCUSUM scheme is strictly larger than γ for the values
of γ considered in the simulation.
In Fig. 5, we illustrate the average detection delay versus
the antenna number of Alice, where we set γ = 3 × 103.
It can be seen from Fig. 5 that both the GCUSUM and the
ED schemes present shorter average detection delays as the
number of antennas of Alice increases. It is worth noting
that when M is not large, the average detection delay of
the proposed GCUSUM scheme is much shorter than the ED
scheme. In Fig. 6, we illustrate the average detection delay
versus the amplitude of the reflecting coefficient of the IRS
rp, where we set M = 64. In general, as rp increases, the
difference between the probability distributions of yk when
Eve does not perform IRS-PCA and when IRS-PCA truly
occurs becomes more significant, and thus the IRS-PCA will
be detected by Alice more quickly. Fig. 6 reveals that when rp
is small, the performance of the proposed GCUSUM scheme is
better than the ED scheme. If rp is sufficiently large, both the
GCUSUM and the ED schemes exhibit short detection delay,
and the ED scheme works slightly better than the proposed
GCUSUM scheme. In Fig. 7, we plot the normalized (by
the length of the DT phase) WAWTG versus the ARL2FA
of Alice’s detector, i.e., γ. From Fig. 7, it can be seen that
WAWTG increases with γ under both the GCUSUM and the
ED schemes, however the increasing rates are quite different.
When rp is small,W(TE) increases much faster thanW(TG),
and compared with the GCUSUM scheme, Eve can intercept
more data before the IRS-PCA is successfully detected by
Alice if Alice adopts the ED scheme. When rp is large, both
the GCUSUM and the ED schemes restrict the WAWTG to
be small, but as γ increases, W(TE) tends to be larger than
W(TG).
In summary, Fig. 5, 6, and 7 reveal that there exists a non-
trivial region of (M, rp, γ) wherein the proposed GCUSUM
scheme can discover the occurrence of IRS-PCA more quickly
and lead to a weaker wiretapping capability of Eve than the
benchmark ED scheme.
B. Secure transmission under IRS-PCA
In this subsection, numerical results are presented to show
the performance of the proposed secure transmission scheme.
We evaluate the SNR of Bob and Eve during the DT phase
under the following conditions,
1) SNRno IRSX : There is no IRS in the system. Eve receives
the signal from Alice passively and does not launch any
attack;
2) SNRIRSX : Eve uses an IRS to enhance its receiving SNR,
but does not perform IRS-PCA, i.e., the IRS is turned off
during the RPT phase.
3) SNRmrt,IRS-PCAX : Eve performs IRS-PCA, and Alice uses
the naive MRT beamforming scheme to transmit its data
to Bob.
4) SNRzf,IRS-PCAX : Eve performs IRS-PCA, and Alice esti-
mates h¯I by using the scheme proposed in Section IV
and adopts the ZF beamforming scheme in (24).
where the subscript X ∈ {b, e} indicates Bob or Eve.
In Fig. 8, we illustrate the SNRs of Bob and Eve versus
the antenna number of Alice. First of all, we point out that
when there is no IRS or when Eve only uses the IRS to
enhance its receiving signal strength during the DT phase,
Alice’s beamforming vector is independent of the channels
of Eve and the IRS, i.e. he and hI, and thus SNR
no IRS
e and
SNRIRSe are independent of M . From Fig. 8, it is worth noting
that even if Eve does not perform IRS-PCA, there exhibits
a notable increase on its wiretapping SNR due to the use
of an IRS. If, in addition, Eve performs IRS-PCA, it can
obtain a huge improvement on its wiretapping SNR (see the
curve of SNR mrt,IRS-PCAe ), and in this case, SNR
mrt,IRS-PCA
e
becomes increasing with M . Besides, the curves of SNRno IRSb
and SNRmrt,IRS-PCAb reveal that the occurrence of the IRS-
PCA leads to the decrease in the SNR of Bob, which is
because wmrt in this case does not accurately match with
Bob’s channel hb. Finally, by using the proposed cooperative
channel estimation and beamforming scheme, Alice is able to
reduce the signal leakage to the IRS, which causes two results:
1) compared with the naive MRT beamforming scheme, the
SNR of Bob can be improved and approaches to SNRno IRSb
and 2) the signal reflected by the IRS becomes weak and Eve
benefits less from the IRS.
In Fig. 9, we illustrate the SNRs of Bob and Eve versus the
number of cooperative nodes J , where we setM = 128. It can
be seen from Fig. 9 that increasing J improves SNRzf,IRS-PCAb
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and greatly reduces SNRzf,IRS-PCAe . This is because the esti-
mation error of h¯I gets small when J increases as indicated
by Theorem 3. If J is sufficiently large, the proposed beam-
forming scheme restricts SNRzf,IRS-PCAe to be even smaller than
SNRIRSe meaning that it is better for Eve not to perform IRS-
PCA.
The amplitude of the reflecting coefficient at the IRS, rp,
plays an important role in the secrecy performance of the
considered system. We illustrate the effects of rp on the SNRs
of Bob and Eve in Fig. 10, where we setM = 128. In general,
if Alice does not adopt any countermeasure on IRS-PCA, then
rp = 1 is optimal for Eve in term of maximizing its wiretap-
ping SNR, as shown by the curve of SNRmrt,IRS-PCAe . However,
if Alice utilizes the propose cooperative channel estimation
and beamforming scheme, the case becomes different. One
one hand, if rp is large, Alice can accurately estimate h¯I and
thus reduces Eve’s SNR. On the other hand, if rp is too small,
then the signal leakage from Alice to the IRS becomes small,
and Eve benefits little from its IRS-PCA. As a result, if Eve
aims at maximizing its SNR, there usually exists an optimal
value of rp within (0, 1), which can be seen from the curve
of SNRzf,IRS-PCAe .
In Fig. 11, we assume that Eve selects the optimal value of
rp to perform IRS-PCA (which is obtained by one-dimensional
search with step size 0.025 in our simulation), and the resulting
SNRs of Bob and Eve are plotted versus the number of reflect-
ing elements of Eve’s IRS. In Fig. 11, by comparing the curve
of SNRmrt,IRS-PCAe with rp = 1 and the curve of SNR
zf,IRS-PCA
e
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Fig. 11: SNR versus N˜ where rp,opt denotes the optimal value of
rp that maximizes the SNR of Eve.
with rp = rp,opt, we can conclude that the proposed secure
transmission scheme can indeed effectively reduce the wire-
tapping SNR even if Eve is able to use the optimal reflecting
amplitude. However, Fig. 11 also reveals that if Eve is able to
increase the number of reflecting elements of its IRS, then it
can greatly enhance the wiretapping capability. In practice, it is
possible that Eve utilizes massive reflecting elements to attack
the legitimate system, which poses severe threat to the security
of the legitimate communication system. One possible solution
is to increasing the number of cooperative nodes, which has
been shown to be useful in Fig. 9. Another possible solution is
to design artificial noise transmission scheme to increase the
noise power level of Eve, which is, however, out the scope of
this paper and left for future work.
VI. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a new PCA scheme for
Eve, namely IRS-PCA, wherein Eve uses an IRS to reflect the
pilot sequence of Bob during the RPT phase. We extensively
reviewed existing countermeasures on PCA in literature and
showed that the proposed IRS-PCA scheme disables many
existing methods. To combat with IRS-PCA, we proposed a
sequential detection scheme, i.e., the GCUSUM scheme, for
Alice to detect whether IRS-PCA has occurred. The ARL2FA,
WADD, and WAWTG of the proposed GCUSUM scheme
have been analyzed. Numerical experiments revealed that the
proposed GCUSUM scheme is better than the benchmark
ED scheme when the antenna number of Alice is not large
enough or when a long ARL2FA is desired. To enable secure
transmission under IRS-PCA, a cooperative channel estimation
scheme has been proposed for Alice to estimate its channel
to the IRS, which can be used to construct ZF beamforming
vector to reduce the signal leakage. Numerical results were
presented to show the performance of the proposed secure
transmission scheme.
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APPENDIX
A. The proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, the following two lemmas are required.
Lemma 1 (Theorem 2, [39], Proposition 2, [41]): Let T be
a stopping time with respect to {y1,y2, · · · } such that P{T <
∞} ≤ 1γ for some γ ∈ (1,∞). For ∀k ≥ 1, let T (k) denote
the stopping time obtained by applying T to {yk,yk+1, · · · },
and define T ∗ = mink≥1{T (k)+k−1}. Then T ∗ is a stopping
time with E∞(T ∗) ≥ γ and D(T ∗) ≤ supk≥1 Ek
(
T (k)
)
.
Lemma 2: Let Tx = inf{n : n ≥
1, x1+x
∑n
k=1
(‖yk‖2 −M ln(1 + x)) ≥ η}, where x > 0, be
a stopping time respect to {y1,y2, · · · }. Under the condition
that y ∼ CN (0, IM ), Tx satisfies P{Tx <∞} ≤ e−η.
Proof: Define F0 as the hypothesis {yk ∼
CN (0, IM ), ∀k ≥ 1} and F1 as the hypothesis
{yk ∼ CN (0, (1 + x)IM ), ∀k ≥ 1}. Tx is in fact the
one-sided sequential probability ratio test that tests F0
against F1 [32], and this lemma directly follows from [32,
Proposition 4.10].
Based on Lemma 1, we now consider the following stopping
time on {y1,y2, · · · }
T = inf
{
n : n ≥ 1, Λ˜n(ξ¯) > η
}
, (27)
where for some ξ¯ > 0, Λ˜n(ξ¯) is given by
Λ˜n(ξ¯) = sup
θ≥ξ¯
θ
1 + θ
Sn − nM ln (1 + θ)
=


nM
(
S¯n − ln S¯n − 1
)
, if S¯n − 1 ≥ ξ¯,
nM
(
ξ¯S¯n
1 + ξ¯
− ln (1 + ξ¯)) , if S¯n − 1 < ξ¯,
with Sn = S1,n and S¯n = S¯1,n. It is obvious that TG = T
∗.
Therefore, to prove E∞(TG) ≥ γ, we only need to prove
P∞{T <∞} ≤ 1γ .
1) The proof of P∞{T < ∞} ≤ 1γ : First of all, we have
that
sup
θ≥ξ¯
θ
1 + θ
Sn − nM ln (1 + θ) ≥ η
⇔Sn ≥ inf
θ≥ξ¯
1 + θ
θ
η +
1 + θ
θ
nM ln (1 + θ)
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⇔Sn ≥ inf
t≥ξ¯′
η
t
− nM ln (1− t)
t
= n inf
t≥ξ¯′
fn(t), (28)
where t = θ1+θ ∈ (0, 1), ξ¯′ = ξ¯1+ξ¯ , and fn(t) ,
(η/n)−M ln(1−t)
t . Now, we calculate the inf in (28). The deriva-
tive of fn(t) is given by f
′
n(t) =
M( t1−t+ln(1−t))−(η/n)
t2 =
Mg(t)−(η/n)
t2 , where g(t) ,
t
1−t + ln (1− t). Due to the fact
that for ∀t ∈ (0, 1), g′(t) = 1(1−t)2 − 11−t = t(1−t)2 ≥ 0, we
obtain 0 = g(0) ≤ g(t) ↑ ∞ as t→ 1, which means that there
exists tn ∈ (0, 1) such that

Mg(tn) =
η
n
;
f ′n(t) ≤ 0, for t ≤ tn;
f ′n(t) ≥ 0, for t ≥ tn.
(29)
As g(t) is monotonically increasing, we conclude that t1 >
t2 > t3 > · · · . Define n∗ as follow
n¯ = inf
n≥1
{
n : tn ≤ ξ¯′
}
=
⌈
η
Mg
(
ξ¯′
)
⌉
≤ η
Mg
(
ξ¯′
) + 1. (30)
Based on (29), we have that inft≥ξ¯′ fn(t) = fn(tn) if n < n¯,
and inft≥ξ¯′ fn(t) = fn(ξ¯
′) if n ≥ n¯. For event {n∗ ≤ T <
∞}, we have that
P∞ {n∗ ≤ T <∞}
= P∞
{∀n < n∗, Sn ≤ fn(tn); ∃n ≥ n∗, Sn > fn (ξ¯′)}
≤ P∞
{∃n ≥ n∗, Sn > fn (ξ¯′)}
≤ P∞
{∃n ≥ 1, Sn > fn (ξ¯′)}
= P∞
{
Tξ¯ <∞
} (∗)≤ e−η. (31)
where step (∗) is due to Lemma 2. For n < n∗, we have that
P∞ {T = n} = P∞ {∀k < n, Sk ≤ fk(tk);Sn > fn(tn)}
≤ P∞
{
Tt′n <∞
} (∗)≤ e−η. (32)
where t′n =
tn
1−tn and step (∗) is due to Lemma 2. Note
that n¯ ≤ h
mg(ξ¯′)
+ 1, therefore P {T < n¯} ≤ η
Mg(ξ¯′)
e−η.
Therefore,
P∞ {T <∞} ≤
(
η
Mg
(
ξ¯′
) + 1
)
e−η
≤
(
2
η
M(ξ¯′)2
+ 1
)
e−η. (33)
By selecting ξ¯ = 1√
M ln(γ)
and η = (1+ oγ(1)) ln γ, we have
P∞ {T <∞} ≤ 1γ for γ →∞.
2) The proof of D(TG) = O
(
ln γ
M(µ−ln(1+µ))
)
: Based
on Lemma 1, we only need to prove that Ek
(
T (k)
)
=
O
(
ln γ
M(µ−ln(1+µ))
)
for ∀k ≥ 1. In the following, for sim-
plicity, we only prove this statement for the case with k = 1,
i.e., E1
(
T (1)
)
= E1 (T ) ≤ (1+oγ(1)) ln γM(µ−ln(1+µ)) . Using the same
approach, this conclusion can be easily extended to the case
with k > 1 due to the uniform convergence in Assumption 3.
Note that ξ¯ → 0 as γ → ∞, and thus 1 + µ > 1 + ξ¯ as
γ →∞. Based on Kolmogorov’s strong law of large numbers,
we have S¯n
a.s.−−−−→
n→∞
1 + µ > 1 + ξ¯ under the condition that
ν = 1. Using the fact that T →∞ as η →∞, we have
T = inf
{
n : n ≥ 1, nM∆(S¯n) > η
}
, as η →∞, (34)
where ∆(x) , x − lnx − 1. Note that
P1
{
1 + 12µ ≤ S¯n ≤ 1 + 32µ
} n→∞−−−−→ 1, and on event{
1 + 12µ ≤ S¯n ≤ 1 + 32µ
}
, we have
nM∆(S¯n)
= nM
{
µ− ln(1 + µ) + µ
1 + µ
(
S¯n − (1 + µ)
)
+
1
2v2n
(
S¯n − (1 + µ)
)2 }
= nM
{
µ
1 + µ
S¯n − ln(1 + µ) + 1
2v2n
(
S¯n − (1 + µ)
)2}
> nM
{
µ
1 + µ
S¯n − ln(1 + µ)
}
=
n∑
k=1
(
µ
1 + µ
‖yk‖2
σ20
−M ln(1 + µ)
)
, (35)
where we expand ∆(x) around x = 1+µ and vn is a random
variable distributed within (1 + 12µ, 1 +
3
2µ). Therefore, as
η →∞, we have that
T < T˜ , inf
{
n : n ≥ 1,
n∑
k=1
(
µ
1 + µ
‖yk‖2
σ20
−M ln(1 + µ)
)
> η
}
, (36)
Using Assumption 3, we have that
1
n
∑n
k=1
(
µ
1+µ
E(‖yk‖2)
σ20
−M ln(1 + µ)
)
→M(µ−ln(1+µ))
as n → ∞. Based on [38, Theorem 2], we have that
limη→∞
E1(T˜ )
η =
1
M(µ−ln(1+µ)) . As η = (1 + oγ(1)) ln(γ),
we obtain that E1(T
(1)) = E1(T ) = O
(
ln γ
M(µ−ln(1+µ))
)
as
γ →∞.
B. The Proof of Corollary 2 and 3
First of all, we note that under the condition Φ(d) = Φ
(d)
ν+k
and Φ(p) = Φ
(p)
ν+k for ∀k ≥ 0, {∆Iν+k : k ≥ 0} is sequence
of i.i.d. random variables, and it can be easily checked that
E(∆Iν+k) > 0 for ∀k ≥ 0. W(TG) can be upper bounded as
follow,
W(TG) = sup
ν≥1
esssup
y
ν−1
1
Eν
{
WTGTG−1|yν−11
}
≤ sup
ν≥1
esssup
y
ν−1
1
Eν
{
WTGTG |yν−11
}
≤ Eν
{
WTGTG |yν−11 = 0
}
≤ Eν


T (ν)+ν−1∑
k=ν
∆Ik

 = E1
{
T∑
k=1
∆Ik
}
= E1(T )E(∆I1), (37)
where the last step is due to Wald’s identity [33, Corollary
2.3.1]. Combining (37) with Corollary 1 leads to Corollary 2
14
and 3.
C. The Proof of Theorem 3
Based on (21), we have T =
[
1
σ1
t1,
1
σ2
t2, · · · , 1σJ tJ
]
=[
tˆ1, tˆ2, · · · , tˆJ
]
and TTH = tˆ1tˆ
H
1 + tˆ2tˆ
H
2 + · · · + tˆJ tˆHJ .
Any eigenvector of TTH that corresponds to a non-zero
eigenvalue, e.g., denoted by ̺, should be in the form of Tκ
for κ ∈ CJ×1 and κ 6= 0, then
TTHTκ = ̺Tκ
⇒ THTTHTκ = ̺THTκ
a.s.⇒ THTκ = ̺κ, (38)
where the last step is because P{rank(THT ) = J} = 1 in our
case. Then κ is a eigenvector of THT with the corresponding
eigenvalue being ̺. Note that as M → ∞, it can be easily
verified that 1M T
HT → IJ +a∗CNaTCN. Therefore, κ→ a∗CN
and λmax(TT
H)→ Ta∗CN/‖Ta∗CN‖ with ̺→ 1 + ‖aCN‖2.
Furthermore, we have
Ta∗CN =
J∑
j=1
(
f˜j +
aj
σj
hI
)
a∗j
σj
=

 J∑
j=1
|aj |2
σ2j

hI + J∑
j=1
a∗j
σj
f˜j (39)
where f˜j =
1
σj
(fj + z˜j) ∼ CN (0, IM ). Dividing the both
sides of (39) by ‖aCN‖2 leads to the result in Theorem 3.
D. Proof of Theorem 4
Due to the fact that he is independent of y and
ˆ¯hI, we
have E{SNRzf,IRS-PCAe } = a
2
e
σ2e
+ |a˜I|
2
σ2e
E
{
N
D
}
, where whereN ,
1
M
∣∣∣hHI (IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI )y∣∣∣2 andD , 1M ∥∥∥(IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI )y∥∥∥2.
Denote h˜b = hb + z. For N, we further have that
N =
|aˆI|2
M
∣∣∣hHI (IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI )hI∣∣∣2
+
1
M
∣∣∣hHI (IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI ) h˜b∣∣∣2
+
2
M
ℜ
{
aˆIh˜
H
b
(
IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI
)
hI
}
× hHI
(
IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI
)
hI.
Similarly, for D, we further have that
D =
1
M
(
h˜b + aˆIhI
)H (
IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI
)(
h˜b + aˆIhI
)
=
1
M
h˜Hb
(
IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI
)
h˜b +
|aˆI|2
M
hHI
(
IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI
)
hI
+
2
M
ℜ
{
aˆIh˜
H
b
(
IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI
)
hI
}
.
Using the fact that ˆ¯hI
M→∞−−−−→ hI+e‖hI+e‖ , we can obtain
that 1Mh
H
I (IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI )hI → 11+‖aCN‖2 , 1M |h˜Hb (IM −
ˆ¯hI
ˆ¯hHI )hI|2 → O(1), 1M h˜Hb (IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI )hI → O(1/
√
M),
and 1M h˜
H
b (IM − ˆ¯hI ˆ¯hHI )h˜b → σ20 . Combining these results
together, we obtain that N → |aˆI|2
(
1
1+‖aCN‖2
)2
M and
D→ σ20 + |aˆI|
2
1+‖aCN‖2 , which proves Theorem 4.
REFERENCES
[1] B. He, X. Zhou, and T. D. Abhayapala, “Wireless physical layer security
with imperfect channel state information: A survey,” ZTE Commun., vol.
11, no. 3, pp. 11–19, Sept. 2013.
[2] X. Zhou, B. Maham, and A. Hjorungnes, “Pilot contamination for active
eavesdropping,” IEEE Trans Wireless Communi., vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 903–
907, Mar. 2012.
[3] Y. O. Basciftci, C. E. Koksal, and A. Ashikhmin, “Physical–layer
security in TDD massive MIMO,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 64,
no. 11, pp. 7359–7380, Nov. 2018.
[4] K.-W. Huang, H.-M. Wang, Y. Wu and R. Schober, “Pilot spoofing attack
by multiple eavesdroppers,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 17, no.
10, pp. 6433-6447, Oct. 2018.
[5] Y. Wu, R. Schober, D. W. K. Ng, C. Xiao, and G. Caire, “Secure
massive MIMO transmission with an active eavesdropper,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 62, no. 7, pp. 3880–3900, July 2016.
[6] D. Kudathanthirige, and G. A. A. Baduge, “Effects of pilot contami-
nation attacks in multi-cell multi-user massive MIMO relay networks,”
IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 67, no. 6, pp. 3905–3922, Jun. 2019.
[7] B. Akgun, M. Krunz, and O. Ozan Koyluoglu, “Vulnerabilities of
massive MIMO systems to pilot contamination attacks,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 1251–1263, May 2019.
[8] D. Kapetanovic´, G. Zheng, K. Wong, and B. Ottersten, “Detection of
pilot contamination attack using random training and massive MIMO,” in
Proc. IEEE 24th Annu. Int. Symp. Pers. Indoor Mobile Radio Commun.
(PIMRC), London, 2013, pp. 13–18.
[9] X. Wang, M. Liu, D. Wang, and C. Zhong, “Pilot contamination attack
detection using random symbols for massive MIMO systems,” in Proc.
IEEE 85th Veh. Technol. Conf. (VTC Spring), Sydney, NSW, 2017, pp.
1-7.
[10] W. Zhang, H. Lin, and R. Zhang, “Detection of pilot contamination
attack based on uncoordinated frequency shifts,” IEEE Trans. Commun.,
vol. 66, no. 6, pp. 2658–2670, June 2018.
[11] J. Xie, Y. Liang, J. Fang, and X. Kang, “Two–stage uplink training for
pilot spoofing attack detection and secure transmission,” in Proc. 2017
IEEE Int. Commun. Conf. (ICC), Paris, France, May 2017, pp. 1–6.
[12] J. K. Tugnait, “Detection and Identification of Spoofed Pilots in
TDD/SDMA Systems,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Let., vol. 6, no. 4, pp.
550–553, Aug. 2017.
[13] J. K. Tugnait, “Self-contamination for detection of pilot contamination
attack in multiple antenna systems,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Let., vol.
4, no. 5, pp. 525–528, Oct. 2015.
[14] J. K. Tugnait, “Pilot spoofing attack detection and countermeasure,”
IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 66, no. 5, pp. 2093–2106, May 2018.
[15] X. Tian, M. Li, and Q. Liu, “Random–training–assisted pilot spoofing
detection and security enhancement,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 27384–
27399, 2017.
[16] W. Wang, N. Cheng, K. C. Teh, X. Lin, W. Zhuang, and X. Shen, “On
countermeasures of pilot spoofing attack in massive MIMO systems: A
double channel training based approach,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.,
vol. 68, no. 7, pp. 6697–6708, July 2019.
[17] D. Hu, W. Zhang, L. He, and J. Wu, “Secure transmission in multi-cell
multi-user massive MIMO systems with an active eavesdropper,” IEEE
Wireless Commun. Let., vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 85–88, Feb. 2019.
[18] Y. Wu, C. Wen, W. Chen, S. Jin, R. Schober and G. Caire, “Data–
aided secure massive MIMO transmission under the pilot contamination
attack,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 67, no. 7, pp. 4765–4781, July 2019.
[19] X. Hou, C. Gao, Y. Zhu, and S. Yang,“Detection of active attacks based
on random orthogonal pilots,” in Proc. IEEE 8th Int. Conf. Wireless
Commun. Signal Process. (WCSP), Yangzhou, China, Oct. 2016, pp.
1–4.
[20] H.-M Wang, K.-W Huang, and T. A. Tsiftsis, “Multiple antennas secure
transmission under pilot spoofing and jamming attack,” IEEE J. Sel.
Areas Commun., vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 860–876, April 2018.
[21] D. Kapetanovic, A. Al-Nahari, A. Stojanovic, and F. Rusek, “Detection
of active eavesdroppers in massive MIMO,” in Proc. IEEE 25th Annu.
Int. Symp. Pers. Indoor Mobile Radio Commun. (PIMRC), Washington,
DC, 2014, pp. 585–589.
[22] R. Zhu, N. Li, X. Tao, and L. Gao, “Location verification system for
pilot spoofing attack detection,” in Proc. IEEE 30th Annu. Int. Symp.
Pers. Indoor Mobile Radio Commun. (PIMRC), Istanbul, Turkey, 2019.
pp. 1–5.
15
[23] N. Gao, Z. Qin, and X. Jing, “Pilot contamination attack detection and
defense strategy in wireless communications,” IEEE Signal Process. Let.,
vol. 26, no. 6, pp. 938–942, June 2019.
[24] Q. Xiong, Y. Liang, K. H. Li, and Y. Gong, “An energy–ratio–based ap-
proach for detecting pilot spoofing attack in multiple-antenna systems,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 932–940, May
2015.
[25] Q. Xiong, Y. Liang, K. H. Li, Y. Gong, and S. Han, “Secure transmission
against pilot spoofing attack: A two–way training-based scheme,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 1017–1026, May 2016.
[26] J. Kang, C. In and H. Kim,“Detection of pilot contamination attack for
multi–antenna based secrecy systems,” in Proc. IEEE 81st Veh. Technol.
Conf. (VTC Spring), Glasgow, 2015, pp. 1–5.
[27] C. Liaskos, S. Nie, A. Tsioliaridou, A. Pitsillides, S. Ioannidis, and I.
Akyildiz, “A new wireless communication paradigm through software-
controlled metasurfaces,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 56, no. 9, pp. 162–
169, Sep. 2018.
[28] Q. Wu and R. Zhang, “Towards smart and reconfigurable environment:
Intelligent reflecting surface aided wireless network,” IEEE Commun.
Mag., vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 106–112, Jan. 2020.
[29] L. Dong and H.-M. Wang, “Secure MIMO transmission via intelligent
reflecting surface,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Let., vol. 9, no. 6, pp. 787-
790, Jun. 2020.
[30] Y. Zeng and R. Zhang, “Wireless information surveillance via proactive
eavesdropping with spoofing relay,” IEEE J. Sel. Topics Signal Process.,
vol. 10, no. 8, pp. 1449–1461, Dec. 2016.
[31] J. K. Tugnait, “On mitigation of active eavesdropping attack by spoofing
relay,” in Proc. IEEE 85th Veh. Technol. Conf. (VTC Spring), Sydney,
NSW, 2017, pp. 1–5.
[32] H. V. Poor and O. Hadjiliadis, Quickest Detection. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009.
[33] A. G. Tartakovsky, I. V. Nikiforov, and M. Basseville, Sequential
Analysis: Hypothesis Testing and Change-Point Detection, ser. Statistics.
Boca Raton, FL, USA: CRC Press, 2013.
[34] J. Joung, E. Kurniawan, and S. Sun, “Channel correlation modeling and
its application to massive MIMO channel feedback reduction,” IEEE
Trans. Veh. Technology, vol. 66, no. 5, pp. 3787–3797, May 2017.
[35] H. Shin and J. H. Lee, “Capacity of multiple-antenna fading channels:
spatial fading correlation, double scattering, and keyhole,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 49, no. 10, pp. 2636–2647, Oct. 2003.
[36] W. Rhee and G. Taricco, “On the ergodic capacity-achieving covariance
matrix of certain classes of MIMO channels,” 2006 IEEE International
Symposium on Information Theory, Seattle, WA, 2006, pp. 1219–1223.
[37] S. Chatzinotas, M. A. Imran, and R. Hoshyar, “On the multicell
processing capacity of the cellular MIMO uplink channel in correlated
rayleigh fading environment,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 8,
no. 7, pp. 3704–715, Jul. 2009.
[38] Y. S. Chow and H. Robbins, “A renewal theorem for random variables
which are dependent or non-identically distributed,” Ann. Math. Statist.,
vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 390–395, 1963.
[39] G. Lorden, “Procedures for reacting to a change in distribution,” Ann.
Math. Stat. vol. 42, no. 6, pp. 1897–1908, Dec. 1971.
[40] G. V. Moustakides, “Optimal stopping times for detecting changes in
distributions,” Ann. Statist. vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 1379–1387, Dec. 1986.
[41] Y. Yao, “Asymptotically optimal detection of a change in a linear model,”
Sequential Anal., vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 201–210, 1993.
